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Abstract∗
van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) (for short, GLM) analyzed combination of pub-
lic pension and child support in an OLG model. We impose credit constraint on workers,
and extend GLM’s analysis from the case where workers do not understand the cost also
to the case where they do. GLM’s infinite stream of generations is simplified into three
generations but heterogeneity of rearing costs and of enjoying children is introduced.
Two major results: (i) excluding negative savings, fertility decreases with pension con-
tributions and increases with taxes; (ii) the introduction of fertility-dependent pensions
may strengthen heterogeneity in fertility.
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1. Introduction
The worldwide population aging is a great challenge to the pension systems of the
21st century (cf. e.g. Barr and Diamond, 2008). One cause of aging is the drop in
the total fertility rate. The other cause is the steep rise in life expectancy even after
eliminating infant mortality. The indexation of retirement age to the life expectancy
is an obvious tool to fight this second problem. But the solution of the first problem
needs another tool, namely to enhance fertility. There are numerous empirical studies
(e.g. Cigno (1992)claiming that the more generous the pension system (equivalently, the
higher the replacement rate, i.e. the ratio of the pension to the net wage), the lower the
endogenous fertility. This gives rise to the policy proposal to introduce child allowances
(more generally, support) and especially fertility-dependent old-age pensions.
A lot of theoretical papers have analyzed this problem. Some of them (starting with
Leibenstein (1957) and Becker (1960)) simply put the number of children into the utility
function without studying the issue of pensions (cf. Eckstein and Wolpin, 1985). In
contrast, van Groozen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) (for short, GLM) set up an overlap-
ping generations model, where the government pays child allowance proportionally to
fertility from labor taxes; charges pension contributions (called PAYG-taxes by GLM)
in young age and pays pension benefits in old age. Assuming away productivity growth
and identifying the lengths of old age and of young age, the family’s pension benefit is
equal to the product of the contribution and the number of children. Identifying the
lengths of raising children and of young age, the tax rate is equal to the product of the
per-child family allowance and of the fertility. (Note also that in such models usually a
single adult is assumed rearing half of his/her children.)
Furthermore, retirees decumulate their private savings to add to their benefits. Con-
sidering a small open economy, the interest rate is given and it is frequently assumed
that private savings are more efficient than public pensions. Choosing their fertility and
private saving, families maximize their discounted lifetime utility functions, consisting of
logarithmic utilities derived from young- and old-age consumption and having children.
The above-mentioned equilibrium model was only a building block of GLM (Sec-
tion 3), and their main emphasis was how to generate long-term social optimum with
its help. Using a Millian rather than a Benthamite social welfare function, they deter-
mined the first-best optimum and tried to achieve it by introducing an appropriate child
support and old-age pension system. (A very ambitious study by Rangel (2003) applied
the tools of game theory to model the interaction of forward and backward directed
intergenerational transfers.)
Among the followers, we mention Fenge and Meier (2009) who confined their at-
tention to the equilibrium part. So doing they proved that the family allowances and
fertility-related pensions are equivalent for earnings-related pensions but the former is
inferior to the latter for flat pensions. (Note the very specific meaning of the words
fertility- and earnings-relatedness in case of homogeneous populations, where every
worker has the same fertility and the same earning!)
The present paper also focuses on the equilibrium part and discusses four models of
the GLM family.
In model 1, “individual agents [in fact, families, A.S.] act atomistically and do not
take [the] budget constraint into account when they choose how many children to raise”
(GLM, p. 240). Making the GLM model more realistic, we introduce a credit constraint,
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excluding negative savings. The credit constraint is called slack, when the saving in-
tention is positive; tight, when it is negative; but in the second case, the actual saving
is zero. In our model 1, the optimal fertility is an increasing function of the tax rate
and—apart from high tax rates and low contribution rates—a decreasing function of
the contribution rate. Introducing paternalistic social welfare function a´ la Feldstein
(1985), where discounting is eliminated, the socially optimal contribution and tax rates
can also be determined explicitly. Due to the special features of the model, the two
optimal transfer rates are equal!
In model 2, deciding on fertility, the social planner takes into account the impacts
neglected so far: the explicit connection between the number of children and the two
types of benefits. This gives rise to higher fertility for low contribution rates and lower
fertility for high contribution rates than in the basic model but the qualitative picture
remains the same. The possible cause of the latter, paradoxical behavior is as follows:
the families with externalities do not realize that after all, they pay the taxes which
cover the child support.
To give more sense to fertility-dependent child support and pensions, in models
3 and 4 we introduce heterogeneous actors. There are two types, the first has lower
rearing cost and higher utility of having children than the second. We shall assume that
the pension benefit is a convex linear combination of two schemes: a common and an
individualized one, the latter being proportional to the type-specific fertility. We shall
see that the equilibrium fertilities satisfy our expectations: type 1 has more children
than type 2 has. (In a separate paper, Simonovits (2013) concentrates on the fertility
block and demonstrates that with growing heterogeneity in rearing costs, the higher cost
type pays more and more net transfer to the other type.) To get rid of the problems of
slack credit constraint for one type and a tight one for the other, we concentrate on the
simplest and probably most relevant case of tight–tight combination.
Though model 3 neglects the incentive effects of fertility-specific pensions, raising
the transfer rates may diminish the less fertile type’s optimal fertility rate. Model 4 is
a combination of models 2 and 3. In the simplest and most interesting case of total
separation of the two types’ pensions, model 4 can be reduced to model 3 and the social
welfare is further increased but the tensions arising between low- and high fertility types
may prevent the introduction of such a system.
Studying a similar model with general rather than logarithmic utility function, Cre-
mer, Gahvari, and Pestieau (2008), for short, CGP) also took into account that the
government has only no information on cost differences. Applying the methods of
mechanism design, they also analyzed the problem of moral hazard (when parents have
not full control over their fertility) and adverse selection (when low-cost type pretend
to be high-cost type). They found that “in the absence of moral hazard problems the
case for a positive link between pension benefits and fertility is not as strong it may at
first appear and as it has been advocated in some recent work” (CGP, p. 962.).
To have a feeling for the order of magnitudes, we shall display several numerical
calculations following our theoretical results. For example, in the basic model, the
maximal fertility is achieved when the contribution rate is 0.1 and the tax rate is 0.4,
while the maximal social welfare is achieved when both rates are approximately equal
to 0.3. Or in the model with heterogeneous rearing costs and relative child utilities and
fertility-related pensions, with the rise of the common transfer rates from 0.15 to 0.25
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(to the social optimum), the lower fertility drops from 2.04 to 1.93!
We call attention to several limitations of the models: (a) the role of social norms
are totally neglected, (b) wage differences are looked over, (c) proportional taxes and
benefits are assumed and (d) the impact of survivor’s pensions are neglected. Concerning
(a), it is obvious that deciding on the number of children, the would-be parents are much
more influenced by their social environment than when they decide on the type of car
they buy. (For the issue of social norms in the welfare state, see Lindbeck, Nyberg
and Weibull (1999).) Concerning (b), uniform family allowances redistribute from the
higher-paid to the lower-paid, while tax allowances do the opposite. Concerning (c),
in some countries, the family benefit and especially the tax allowance are strongly
nonlinear. (For example, since 2011, in Hungary, the birth of the third child more than
triples the maximal per-child tax allowance!) Concerning (d), the existence of survivor’s
pensions is a significant pro-family tool and there are proposals to diminish or eliminate
it.
The structure of the remaining part of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss
homogeneous fertility with and without externalities on public transfers, respectively.
Section 4 studies heterogeneous endogenous fertility. Section 5 concludes. An Appendix
contains the more technical proofs.
2. Homogeneous fertility with externality (second-best)
In this Section we recapitulate the equilibrium part of GLM based on the usual two-
period overlapping generations model with homogeneous fertility and externality, modify
and develop it further.
Framework
We keep their notations except for replacing their young and old-age consumption cy
and co by c and e, respectively and abbreviating their interest factor 1 + r by R. It is
heroically assumed that the tax and contribution rates do not influence the labor supply
which is equal to unity. Furthermore, in our small open economy, the world interest
rate determines the domestic interest rate.
Total wage: w = 1, pension contribution (rate): τ , tax (rate): θ, saving: s. The
cost of rearing a child: p, per child benefit: ϕ, fertility, i.e. the number of children in
a family: n, the pay-as-you-go benefit: η; all positive real numbers. Another heroic
assumption: the number of children can be any positive real!
Young-age (c) and old-age consumptions (e) are respectively
c+ (p− ϕ)n = 1− τ − θ − s and e = Rs+ η. (1)
The lifetime utility function is logarithmic:
U(c, n, e) = log c+ γ log n+ β log e, (2)
where γ is the coefficient of the relative utility of having children and β is the discount
factor, γ > 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Introducing the net of contribution wage τˆ = 1 − τ and
inserting (1) into (2) yield the reduced utility function:
u(s, n) = log(τˆ − θ − s− (p− ϕ)n) + γ logn+ β log(Rs+ η). (2∗)
3
Denoting the individual optimum by c(τ, θ), n(τ, θ), e(τ, θ) and following the idea
of Feldstein (1985), we define a paternalistic social welfare function by replacing the
discount factor β with 1 in (2). Then our social welfare function is
V (τ, θ) = log c(τ, θ) + γ logn(τ, θ) + log e(τ, θ).
As we have indicated in the Introduction, in our basic model, the workers neglect
the impact of their decisions on the balances described in (4) below. Filling the gap left
in GLM, from now on we exclude negative savings, and distinguish two cases: either
slack or tight credit constraint.
To learn if the credit constraint is slack or tight, we must determine the separatrix
curve θ(τ) which separates the two domains in the (τ, θ)-plane.
Lemma 1. a) The separatrix curve θ(τ) is given by
θ(τ) =
[βp− γR−1τ ]τˆ
βp+R−1τ
, where 0 ≤ τ < γ−1βpR.
b) The separatrix curve starts from θ(0) = 1 and ends at θ(τM ) = 0, where
τM = γ−1βpR; and θ(τ) is declining in [0, τM ].
c) If 0 ≤ τ < τM and 0 < θ < θ(τ), then s(τ, θ) > 0: slack.
d) If 0 ≤ τ ≤ τM and θ(τ) ≤ θ ≤ 1− τ , then s(τ, θ) = 0: tight.
e) If τM < τ ≤ 1− θ, then s(τ, θ) = 0: tight.
Slack credit constraint (S)
We continue the analysis with the slack credit constraint. Copying GLM, we take
the partial derivatives of (2) with respect to s and n yields the first-order necessary
conditions for optimum:
0 = u′s(s, n) =
−1
τˆ − θ − s− (p− ϕ)n +
βR
Rs+ η
(3a)
and
0 = u′n(s, n) =
−(p− ϕ)
τˆ − θ − s− (p− ϕ)n +
γ
n
. (3b)
For the time being, we do not exclude negative savings. Then the conditional optima
are
c(τ, θ) =
τˆ − θ +R−1η
1 + β + γ
and n(τ, θ) =
γc(τ, θ)
p− ϕ . (4)
Here pension η and per-child allowance ϕ depend on fertility n, therefore we introduce
the transfer equations mentioned in the Introduction:
θ = ϕn and η = τn. (5)
In words: a) the family’s pension benefit is equal to the product of the contribution and
the number of children; b) the tax rate is equal to the product of the per-child family
allowance and of the fertility.
4
It is time to explain the role of these transfers. There is a general presumption—
which we follow—that these two transfer systems should be balanced separately but in
some countries this is not the case. For example, countries like Denmark, operate flat
public pensions and finance the system from personal income taxes rather than from
pension contributions. On the other hand, there are countries like Hungary, which use
pension contributions for correcting distortions in their personal income tax systems.
The introduction of per-child support ϕ reduces the private cost of rearing a child
from p to p − ϕ. If (5a) holds, there is no income effect. The introduction of the
contribution rate τ diminishes the young-age consumption by the same amount and
increases the old-age consumption according to η = τn [(5b)]. In a stationary economy
with n = 1, the two changes cancel each other; for falling/growing population, the
reduction of young-age consumption is greater/lower than the increase of the old-age
consumption. Using the concept of dynamic efficiency: R > n, the comparison above
changes. As is known, in a dynamically efficient economy, the introduction of a pay-as-
you-go pension is suboptimal etc.
Inserting the transfer equations (5a)–(5b) into (3a)–(3b) yields the final optima (see
GLM):
Theorem 1. a) When the credit constraint is slack (Lemma 1c), then the individ-
ually optimal young-age consumption and fertility are given respectively:
c∗S =
τˆ − θ[1− τ/(pR)]
1 + β + γ − γτ/(pR) and n
∗
S =
γτˆ + (1 + β)θ
(1 + β + γ)p− γR−1τ . (6)
b) For a given contribution rate τ , the optimal fertility is an increasing function of
the tax rate θ. For a given tax rate θ, the optimal fertility is a decreasing/increasing
function of the contribution rate if the tax rate is lower/higher than the critical tax rate
θo =
(1 + β + γ)pR− γ
1 + β
.
c) The family support is always lower than the expenditure on children: 0 ≤ ϕ < p.
Remark. If θo < 0, then the first case (decreasing fertility: normal) is empty; if
θo > θ(τ), then the second case (increasing fertility: paradox) is empty. Denoting by
τo the root of θo = θ(τ), to be called critical contribution rate, normalcy prevails in
interval τo < τ < 1.
Tight credit constraint (T)
Now we turn to the tight credit constraint: s = 0. We must replace condition u′s(0, n) =
0 [(3a)] by u′s(0, n) < 0 and then (3b) becomes u′n(0, n) = 0. By easy calculation we
obtain
(p− ϕ)n = γc = γ[τˆ − θ − (p− ϕ)n]. (7)
Inserting the budget condition θ = ϕn, and the notation γ¯ = 1 + γ, we end-up with
5
Theorem 2. a) When the credit constraint is tight (Lemma 1d+e), the optimal
fertility and the corresponding young-age consumption are respectively
n∗T =
γτˆ + θ
γ¯p
and c∗T =
τˆ − θ
γ¯
. (8)
b) The optimal fertility is a decreasing function of the contribution rate and an
increasing function of the tax rate.
c) For 0 < γ < 1, the equal increase of the transfer rates increases the optimal
fertility: ∆τ = ∆θ > 0 implies ∆n∗T > 0.
Note that only having determined the optimal fertility in the two regions, can we
prove Lemma 1.
Next we determine the socially optimal pair of contribution and tax rates in the
tight region.
Theorem 3. In the region of tight credit constraint, the socially optimal contribu-
tion and tax rates are equal respectively to
τ∗ = θ∗ =
1
3 + γ
. (9)
Remarks. 1. It is easy to show that the optimal pair of transfer rates in (9)
generate tight credit constraint.
2. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that probably there is no local maxima of the social welfare
function in the region of slack credit constraint.
3. In a prototype model without pensions, Simonovits (2013) also introduces a
paternalistic coefficient γ∗, to derive extra children.
Single instruments
It may be helpful further analyzing the two cases when either a) there is no child-support
or b) there is no old-age pension.
a) No child-support: θ = 0 = ϕ
By Lemma 1, the optimal saving s > 0 if 0 ≤ τ < γ−1βpR, zero otherwise. Then
the optimal adult consumption and fertility are respectively equal to
c∗S =
τˆ
1 + β + γ − γτ/(pR) and n
∗
S =
γτˆ
(1 + β + γ)p− γR−1τ (6a)
and
n∗T =
γτˆ
γ¯p
and c∗T =
τˆ
γ¯
. (8a)
b) No pensions: τ = 0 and η = 0
By Lemma 1, θ(0) = 1, i.e. for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, the optimal saving is positive and the
optimal adult consumption and fertility are respectively equal to
c∗S =
1− θ
1 + β + γ
and n∗S =
γ + (1 + β)θ
(1 + β + γ)p
. (6b)
Note that the extreme pair (τ, θ) = (0, 1) provide the highest fertility: n∗S = 1/p.
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Numerical illustrations
To have a feeling for the order of magnitudes, we shall display several illustrative nu-
merical calculations. Note that our contribution and tax rates are higher than they
should be, because we do not scale down the length of the periods spent with raising
children (length of 20 years) and drawing pensions (length of 20 years) with respect to
the working period (length of 40 years).
Example 1. Assume a 30-year long period between accumulation and decumula-
tion, and choose β = 0.4 (annual discount rate of 3%), p = 0.2, γ = 0.5. To give
room for an unfunded pension system, we assume βR < 1. We choose a low enough
interest factor, namely R = 1.5 (annual interest rate being 1.4%). Then changing the
contribution and the tax rates, their impact can be studied also numerically.
First we present the separatrix (discussed in Lemma 1). It declines from 1 to 0 while
the contribution rate τ rises from 0 to 0.24. The critical tax rate θo = 0.05 and the
corresponding contribution rate τo = 0.2. Second, from Theorem 3, τ∗ = θ∗ = 0.286,
close 0.3, appearing in the Tables 1 and 2 below.
As is well-known, the numerical value of the social welfare function has no economic
content. To obtain meaningful numbers, we shall occasionally compare the welfare
provided by a (τ, θ)-system with the no-transfer system’s (0, 0) as follows. Let us define
the relative efficiency of the former with respect to the latter by the positive number
ε(τ, θ) if multiplying the unit wage by ε in the no-transfer system, the welfare would
reach that value provided by the transfer system with unitary wages. In formula:
V [ε, 0, 0] = V [1, τ, θ].
Due to the simple utility function (2), the optimal fertility is independent of the wage and
the optimal consumption pair are homogeneous linear functions of the wage. Therefore
2 log ε(τ, θ)+log c(0, 0))+γ logn(0, 0)+log e(0, 0) = log c(τ, θ)+γ log n(τ, θ)+log e(τ, θ).
Hence log ε(τ, θ) or ε(τ, θ) can simply be determined:
2 log ε(τ, θ) + V [1, 0, 0] = V [1, τ, θ] i.e. ε(τ, θ) = exp[0.5(V [1, τ, θ]− V [1, 0, 0])].
Example 1, continued. To stay in the real world, we limit the contribution and
the tax rate by 0.4–0.4, respectively. Starting with the optimal fertility, the first line of
Table 1 (no pension) shows a marked rise in fertility in parallel with the tax rate from
1.3 (at θ = 0) to 2.79 (at θ = 0.4). The first column (not considering the column of
contribution rates) of Table 1 (no child allowance) displays a marked sink in fertility
while the contribution rate rises: from 1.32 (at τ = 0) to 1.0 (at τ = 0.4). Similar
tendencies can be observed in the other lines and columns, respectively, though for
low enough tax rates (with positive savings) the fertility is paradoxically an increasing
function of the contribution rate: for example for θ = 0.1, the fertility rises from 1.684
to 1.702 while the contribution rate τ rises from 0 to 0.1. The maximal fertility (2.83)
is achieved around (τ, θ) = (0.1, 0.4).
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Table 1. Transfer rates and fertility
T a x r a t e (θ)
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Contribution
rate (τ)
0.0 1.316 1.684 2.053 2.421 2.789
0.1 1.298 1.702 2.106 2.500 2.833
0.2 1.277 1.667 2.000 2.333 2.667
0.3 1.167 1.500 1.833 2.167 2.500
0.4 1.000 1.333 1.667 2.000 2.333
Remark. p = 0.2 and γ = 0.5
Next we display the dependence of the relative efficiency of the transfer system on
the transfer rates. The first line of Table 2 (no pension system) displays the drop in
the relative welfare as the tax rate rises: from 1 (at θ = 0) to 0.72 (at θ = 0.4). The
first column of Table 2 (no child allowance) displays the drop in the relative welfare as
the contribution rate rises: from 1 (at τ = 0) to 0.92 (at τ = 0.4). No other column
and only the next row, however, show similar monotonicity. The fourth line and the
fourth column contains the entry of the approximately maximal efficiency, namely 1.16
at (τ, θ) = (0.3, 0.3). In this sense, the social optimum is achieved for the careful
harmonization of the contribution and the tax rates.
Table 2. Transfer rates and relative efficiency
T a x r a t e (θ)
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Contribution
rate (τ)
0.0 1.000 0.957 0.894 0.815 0.724
0.1 0.983 0.974 0.945 0.911 0.913
0.2 0.963 1.026 1.089 1.116 1.104
0.3 0.962 1.075 1.141 1.157 1.115
0.4 0.916 1.038 1.097 1.089 0.999
To get a more detailed picture, we repeat the calculations along the diagonal with
τ = θ but display not only the fertility and the relative efficiency but also the young-
and the old-age consumption and the subjective utility. First of all, note that the
optimal saving is only positive for low enough contribution and tax rates, namely below
τ = θ = 0.15. The subjective utility function is decreasing for low and high rates, its
maximum is achieved in the interval [0.15, 0.2]. The relative efficiency behaves similarly
but its maximum is reached in the interval [0.25, 0.3].
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Table 3. The impact of the equal transfer rates with externality
Transfer Young-age Old-age LT utility Relative
rates Fertility Saving c o n s u m p t i o n function efficiency
τ = θ n∗ s∗ c∗ e∗ U∗ ε
0.00 1.316 0.211 0.526 0.316 –0.966 1.000
0.05 1.500 0.150 0.500 0.300 –0.972 0.982
0.10 1.702 0.079 0.481 0.288 –0.964 0.974
0.15 1.917 0 0.467 0.288 –0.935 0.987
0.20 2.000 0 0.400 0.400 –0.936 1.089
0.25 2.083 0 0.333 0.521 –0.993 1.146
0.30 2.167 0 0.267 0.650 –1.107 1.157
0.35 2.250 0 0.200 0.788 –1.300 1.113
0.40 2.333 0 0.133 0.933 –1.619 0.999
LT=Lifetime
Finally, we shall consider the sensitivity of fertility to the relative utility of children
(γ) and the cost of raising children (p), while holding the transfer rates fixed at 0.3.
Table 4 displays the optimal fertility as a function of these parameter values. If the
child utility parameter drops by 16% (from 0.5 to 0.42) and the cost of raising a child
rises by 20% (from 0.2 to 0.24), then the fertility sinks by 20% (from 2.167 to 1.743).
Similarly, if the child utility parameter rises by 16% (from 0.5 to 0.58) and the cost of
raising a child decreases by 20% (from 0.2 to 0.16), then the fertility increases by 29%
(from 2.167 to 2.793).
Table 4. Dependence of fertility on utility and cost
Utility of children Cost of child Fertility
γ p n
0.420 0.240 1.743
0.460 0.220 1.936
0.500 0.200 2.167
0.540 0.180 2.446
0.580 0.160 2.793
Remark. τ = θ = 0.3.
3. Homogeneous fertility without externalities (first best)
In Section 2, we assumed that there are externalities (second best). Now we turn to the
diametrically opposite case, when the representative agent or the government fully takes
into account the macrorelations (first best). Then the child allowance disappears and
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the investment side of the fertility is fully taken into account. We display the modified
equations (with tilde) and the corresponding optimality conditions.
Consumption functions:
c = τˆ − s− pn and e = Rs+ τn. (1˜)
Derived utility function
u(s, n) = log(τˆ − s− pn) + γ log n+ β log(Rs+ τn). (2˜∗)
Taking the partial derivatives of u with respect to s and n yields the first-order necessary
conditions for optimum:
0 = u′s(s, n) =
−1
τˆ − s− pn +
βR
Rs+ τn
(3˜a)
0 = u′n(s, n) =
−p
τˆ − s− pn +
γ
n
+
βτ
Rs+ τn
. (3˜b)
We separate the two cases again, and obtain the optimal fertilities. Introducing the new
separating contribution rate (which is independent of the tax rate θ)
τ˜M =
pβR
β + γ
,
we have
Theorem 4. If there is no externality, then the optimal fertility is given for slack
credit constraint,
n˜∗S =
βRτˆ
γ−1(1 + β)[pβR− (β + γ)τ ] + pβR+ τ , τ ≤ τ˜M (6˜)
and for tight credit constraint,
n˜∗T =
(β + γ)τˆ
(1 + β + γ)p
; τ > τ˜M . (8˜)
Continuing the numerical explorations, as a function of the contribution rate, Table
5 reports again increasing fertility for the slack case and decreasing one for the tight case
but at a higher/lower level than before. Indeed, comparing (8) and (8˜), this paradoxical
behavior can be proven. (The comparison of (6) and (6˜) would be much more tiring.)
Lemma 2. If for a given transfer rates pair, the systems with and without ex-
ternality have tight credit constraint and if βτˆ < (1 + β + γ)θ holds, then the optimal
fertility is lower with externality than without externality:
n∗T < n˜
∗
T .
The proof is left to the Appendix, but the intuitive justification is as follows: in
our model family, the lack of externality means that the tax rate has no influence on
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the fertility. With our parameter values, for τ = 0.2 = θ, τ˜M = 0.133 and then the
condition of Lemma 2 holds:
0.4× 0.8 = 0.32 < 0.38 = 1.9× 0.2.
We make the following observations: individual fertility is maximized around the com-
mon transfer rates 0.15, while the socially optimal pairs are still around 0.3.
Table 5. The impact of the equal transfer rates, no externality
Transfer Young-age Old-age LT utility Relative
rates Fertility Saving c o n s u m p t i o n function efficiency
τ = θ n∗ s∗ c∗ e∗ U∗ ε
0.00 1.316 0.211 0.526 0.316 –0.966 1.000
0.05 1.500 0.150 0.500 0.300 –0.972 0.999
0.10 1.776 0.071 0.474 0.284 –0.963 1.015
0.15 2.013 0 0.447 0.302 –0.933 1.158
0.20 1.895 0 0.421 0.379 –0.934 1.239
0.25 1.776 0 0.395 0.444 –0.967 1.278
0.30 1.658 0 0.368 0.497 –1.025 1.285
0.35 1.539 0 0.342 0.539 –1.104 1.265
0.40 1.421 0 0.316 0.568 –1.203 1.223
LT=lifetime
4. Heterogeneous fertility with externalities
Having discussed the simplest cases of homogeneous fertility with and without exter-
nality, we turn to the more realistic and more interesting case of heterogeneous fertility.
Framework
We confine attention to the simpler case when there are externalities. To derive het-
erogeneity in the optimally chosen number of children, we shall assume the existence of
two types indexed as i = 1, 2. They differ in the following parameter values: the cost
of a child pi and the relative utility of a child γi, with the following plausible orderings
(cf. CGP):
p1 > p2 > 0 and 0 < γ1 < γ2.
In words: type 1 is less efficient than type 2 is. The corresponding population shares
are denoted by f1, f2 > 0, their sum being equal to 1: f1 + f2 = 1. Let the average
number of children be
n = f1n1 + f2n2. (10a)
It is a weakness of our static model that the initial distribution of the two types
changes during a generation: (f1, f2) becomes (f1n1/n, f2n2/n).
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Note that here we assume that type i’s transfers are dependent on the type-specific
fertility ni, but for the time being, the types do not take this into account. We define
the new transfer rules. The aggregate child allowance rule simply remains θ = ϕn.
We assume that the type-specific pension formula is an increasing inhomogeneous
linear function of the type-specific fertility. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] be the weight of the common
and δˆ = 1− δ be the weight of the individual pension:
ηi = δτn+ δˆτni, i = 1, 2. (10b)
If δ = 0, then we have two separate pension systems for the low and the high types.
If δ = 1, then we have a unified pension system, studied above. In general, we shall
assume 0 < δ < 1.
Young-age and old-age consumptions are respectively
ci = τˆ − θ − (pi − ϕ)ni − si and ei = Rsi + ηi. (11)
The lifetime utility functions are as follows:
Ui(ci, ni, ei) = log ci + γi log ni + β log ei. (12)
Substituting (11) into (12) yields the type-specific reduced utility function:
ui(si, ni) = log(τˆ − θ − (pi − ϕ)ni − si) + γi log ni + β log(Rsi + ηi). (13)
We solve the individual optimization problems for slack and tight credit constraints
separately.
In the case of slack credit constraint, taking the partial derivatives with respect to
si and ni (cf. (6)), yields
c∗i =
τˆ − θ +R−1ηi
1 + β + γi
and n∗i =
γic
∗
i
pi − ϕ. (14)
In the case of tight credit constraint, we return to (7):
(pi − ϕ)ni = γici = γi[τˆ − θ − (pi − ϕ)ni]. (15)
With rearrangement, and using notation γ¯i = 1 + γi,
γ¯i(pi − ϕ)ni = γi(τˆ − θ), i = 1, 2. (16)
Note that it is possible that one type has a slack credit constraint and the other has
a tight one. There are four combinations:
s1, s2 > 0, s1 > 0 = s2, s2 > 0 = s1, s1 = 0 = s2.
We omit the discussion of the separation of the cases and for a while, suppress the
notation of the interaction of the two types’ optima. We have the following trivial
observation for the two pure combinations of types (cf. (14) and (16)).
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Lemma 3. If both types have either slack: s1, s2 > 0 or tight credit constraint:
s1 = s2 = 0, then the less efficient type has lower fertility than the more efficient has:
p1 > p2 > 0 and 0 < γ1 < γ2 implies n∗1 < n
∗
2.
Due to Lemma 3, we may simply call the less/more efficient type less/more fertile.
Fertility depednent pensions without incentives
Due to its relevance and simplicity, we shall confine our attention to the fourth combi-
nation, when both types’ savings are zero:
si = 0 and u′i,ni(0, ni) =
−(pi − ϕ)
τˆ − θ − (pi − ϕ)ni +
γi
ni
= 0, i = 1, 2. (17)
To determine the optimum, we must determine the equilibrium value of ϕ.
Theorem 5. Consider a fertility-specific transfer system, where the workers do not
take into account this feature of the pension system. In the tight–tight optimum, the
per-child allowance ϕ is the smaller positive root of the following quadratic equation:
Aϕ2 +Bϕ+ C = 0, (18)
where the coefficients in (18) are respectively
A = ωγ¯1γ¯2 + f1γ1γ¯2 + f2γ2γ¯1, (19a)
B = ωγ¯1γ¯2(p1 + p2) + f1γ1γ¯2p2 + f2γ2γ¯1p1, (19b)
C = γ¯1γ¯2p1p2, (19c)
where
ω =
θ
τ − θ and γ¯i = 1 + γi, i = 1, 2. (20)
Finally, we define the paternalistic and utilitarian social welfare function:
V =
2∑
i=1
fiu
∗
i [s
∗
i , n
∗
i ], where u
∗
i [s
∗
i , n
∗
i ] = log c
∗
i + γ log n
∗
i + log e
∗
i . (21)
Example 2. We assume that the shares of the two types are equal: f1 = f2 = 0.5;
and differentiate the costs and utilities of child between the two types: p1 = 0.22,
p2 = 0.18 and γ1 = 0.46, γ2 = 0.54 (cf. Table 4). For the time being, the pension
benefits are uniform: δ = 1.
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Table 6 shows the difference with the homogeneous cases. In the heterogeneous
case, the equal increase of the transfer rates (above 0.2–0.2) diminishes type 1’s fer-
tility, though still increases the average fertility. The basic reason for this paradoxical
behavior is probably connected to the introduction of net transfers from type 1 to type
2. Furthermore, the rise in the transfer rates above 0.2 diminishes both types’ subjective
lifetime utilities but the socially optimal contribution rate remains close 0.3. Since we
do not deal with slack constraints, the value of the social welfare function at no transfer
is unknown. Therefore we must take the maximum as our starting point for measuring
the relative efficiency of the system.
Table 6. The impact of equal transfer rates: heterogeneous types, uniform pensions
Transfer Utility-1 Utility-2 Relative
rates Fertility-1 Fertility-2 f u n c t i o n efficiency
τ = θ n∗1 n
∗
2 U
∗
1 U
∗
2 ε
0.15 1.539 2.375 –1.027 –0.812 0.850
0.20 1.545 2.554 –1.046 –0.793 0.940
0.25 1.523 2.765 –1.127 –0.825 0.990
0.30 1.460 3.028 –1.279 –0.908 1.000
0.35 1.328 3.375 –1.530 –1.057 0.961
Remark. p1 = 0.22, p2 = 0.18 and γ1 = 0.46, γ2 = 0.54
Next we turn to the differentiated pensions: 0 ≤ δ < 1. For the time being, we
exclude incentive effects. To obtain a marked difference, we consider the maximal
differentiation with δ = 0. The outcomes displayed in Table 7 are basically the same:
the less efficient type receives even less utility, the more efficient receives even higher
utility and in balance, the maximal social welfare is slightly less than with uniform
pensions and reached at transfer rates close to 0.25 rather than to 0.3.
Table 7. The impact of transfer rates: heterogeneous types, differentiated pensions
Transfer Utility-1 Utility-2 Relative
rates Fertility-1 Fertility-2 f u n c t i o n efficiency
τ = θ n∗1 n
∗
2 U
∗
1 U
∗
2 ε
0.15 1.539 2.375 –1.123 –0.734 0.867
0.20 1.545 2.554 –1.159 –0.705 0.955
0.25 1.523 2.765 –1.264 –0.723 1.000
0.30 1.460 3.028 –1.451 –0.788 0.999
0.35 1.328 3.375 –1.758 –0.912 0.941
What happens if the types do take into account the fertility dependence of the child
allowance and the pension?
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Fertility-dependent pensions with incentives
Introducing the game-theoretic notation −i as the ‘other’ player’s index, similarly to
(3b) and (3˜b), (17) is modified into
u′i,ni(0, ni, n−i) =
−(pi − ϕ)
τˆ − θ − (pi − ϕ)ni +
γi
ni
+
δˆβ
δn+ δˆni
= 0, i = 1, 2. (17∗)
If 0 < δ < 1, then we have a system of two nonlinear equations, which is probably
only solvable with numerical methods. Moreover, we do not want to consider a Cournot-
game between less and more fertile types.
However, for total separation of pensions: δ = 0, i.e. δˆ = 1, (17*) breaks up into
two independent equations:
−(pi − ϕ)
τˆ − θ − (pi − ϕ)ni +
γi
ni
+
β
ni
= 0, i = 1, 2. (1˜7)
Comparing (17) and (1˜7), the only difference between them is that γi in (17) is replaced
by γi + β in (1˜7). This observation proves
Theorem 6. a) For total separation pensions (δ = 0), introducing the incentive
effects is equivalent to add the discount factor β to the relative child utility coefficient
γi:
γ˜ = γi + β.
b) The activation of incentives obviously raises the total fertility but decreases the
lower type’s fertility.
We repeat the numerical calculations with the new γ˜is. Table 8 shows that the
socially optimal contribution and tax rates get lower, around 0.25 and the two types’
utilities and social welfare are further increased.
Table 8. The impact of transfer rates:
heterogeneous types, totally differentiated pensions with incentives
Transfer Utility-1 Utility 2 Relative
rates Fertility-1 Fertility-2 f u n c t i o n efficiency
τ = θ n∗1 n
∗
2 U
∗
1 U
∗
2 ε
0.15 2.039 2.857 –0.838 –0.372 0.911
0.20 1.997 2.938 –0.904 –0.373 0.978
0.25 1.934 3.045 –1.037 –0.418 1.000
0.30 1.837 3.193 –1.253 –0.505 0.979
0.35 1.680 3.414 –1.591 –0.641 0.908
The picture is quite difficult to understand. To help better understanding, in Ta-
ble 9 we look for the critical heterogeneity between γs and ps which keeps the low
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fertility–transfer rate function n1(τ, τ) almost constant. By trial and error we choose
the following coefficients:
γ1 = 0.496, γ2 = 0.504, and p1 = 0.202, p2 = 0.198.
Note how small the differences between the two types are. The per child allowance ϕ
and the net transfer t2 = ϕn∗2 − θ received are also displayed in Table 9. While the
per child allowance is quite impressive, due to the minimal differences in the parameter
values, the net transfer received remains definitely modest.
Table 9. Critical heterogeneity, totally differentiated pensions with incentives
Transfer Per child Net transfer
rates Fertility-1 Fertility-2 allowance received by 2
τ = θ n∗1 n
∗
2 ϕ t2
0.15 2.368 2.449 0.062 0.003
0.20 2.375 2.468 0.083 0.004
0.25 2.379 2.490 0.103 0.006
0.30 2.379 2.517 0.123 0.008
0.35 2.371 2.552 0.142 0.013
γ1 = 0.496, γ2 = 0.504, p1 = 0.202, p1 = 0.198.
As a summary of this Section, we make the following remarks. The policy results
are quite impressive but there are well-known limits to its application: a) the less fertile
part of the population would not vote for such a policy; b) even if such a policy were
accepted, it would fatally weaken the incentives of the less fertile part to supply labor
and report their incomes; c) in practice, the less fertile support the more fertile within
the larger family (for examples, less fertile aunts support more fertile siblings’ nephews,
while less fertile uncles support more fertile siblings’ nieces; d) widespread divorce and
the existence of widow’s pension also complicate the situation.
5. Conclusions
We have revisited GLM’s siamese twins of public pension and child support, at least in
its equilibrium framework. Public pension is important because the young are short-
sighted and the large families had broken up. Child support is important because the
introduction of public pension may undermine fertility (externality). We have empha-
sized the importance of modeling credit constraints and have distinguished the slack
and the tight credit constraints in developing GLM’s model. Also we studied the role
of endogenous and heterogeneous fertility with and without externality.
An important but largely neglected dimension of the fertility issue is heterogeneity:
there are families with low fertility and others with high fertility produced by high-
cost, low-utility and low-cost, high-utility types, respectively. Here the redistribution
between the two types in the child allowances cannot be forgotten, regardless of the
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existence externalities. In various countries (including Germany and Hungary) there
are also plans to make the pension benefits to be partly proportional to fertility. We
are able to model such a design and at least on paper, it increases the average fertility.
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons against its application. To name just one: such
a policy may polarize the society into fertiles and infertiles.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1b
Take the derivative of n∗S(τ, θ) with respect to τ and drop the constants:
∂n∗S(τ, θ)
∂τ
≈ γ[(1 + β + γ)p− γR−1τ ] + [γτˆ + θ(1 + β)]γR−1.
A simple calculation yields that
∂n∗S(τ, θ)
∂τ
< 0 if and only if θ < θo.
Proof of Lemma 1
Inserting the formulas for n∗S and n
∗
T into the separatrix, n
∗
S = n
∗
T results in
γτˆ + (1 + β)θ
(1 + β + γ)p− γR−1τ =
γτˆ + θ
γ¯p
.
With rearrangement, [γτˆ + (1 + β)θ]γ¯p = [γτˆ + θ][(1 + β + γ)p− γR−1τ ]. After simpli-
fication, θ(τ) is obtained. For θ > θ(τ), s(τ, θ) = 0; for θ < θ(τ), s(τ, θ) > 0.
The separatrix is a fraction: its numerator is the product of two decreasing positive
functions and its denominator is an increasing positive function, therefore the fraction
is also declining.
Proof of Theorem 3
For simplicity, we confine our attention to the tight credit condition. Our starting point
is as follows:
V {τ, θ} = log 1− τ − θ
γ¯
+ γ log
γτˆ + θ
γ¯p
+ log
τ(γτˆ + θ)
γ¯p
→ max .
Using the identity log(x/y) = log x − log y, the constant denominators can be
dropped. We have then an equivalent problem:
W{τ, θ} = log(1− τ − θ) + γ¯ log(γ(1− τ) + θ) + log τ → max .
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Taking the partial derivatives of W with respect to τ and θ and equate the derivatives
to zero yield the first-order necessary conditions:
0 =
∂W
∂τ
=
−1
1− τ − θ −
γ¯γ
γ(1− τ) + θ +
1
τ
(A1)
and
0 =
∂W
∂θ
=
−1
1− τ − θ +
γ¯
γ(1− τ) + θ . (A2)
From (A2),
θ =
1− τ
2 + γ
= κ(1− τ). (A3)
Inserting back (A3) into (A1),
−1
(1− κ)(1− τ) −
γ¯γ
(γ + κ)(1− τ) +
1
τ
= 0.
Hence Theorem 3 is obtained.
Proof of Theorem 4
Slack credit constraint
Combining (3˜a) and (3˜b) leads to
pβR
Rs+ τn
=
p
τˆ − s− pn =
γ
n
+
βτ
Rs+ τn
.
With rearrangement,
s = γ−1R−1[pβR− (β + γ)τ ].
Rewrite (3˜a) as (Rs+ τn) = βR(τˆ − s− pn) or
R(1 + β)s = βRτˆ − (pβR+ τ)n
Inserting s into our last equation leads to (6˜a).
Tight credit constraint
With s = 0, (3˜b) reduces to
0 = u′n(0, n) =
−p
τˆ − pn +
γ
n
+
β
n
. (3bo)
Solving for n˜T yields the result. To obtain the separatrix, one needs to substitute n˜T
into the modified (3˜a):
u′s(0, n) =
−1
τˆ − pn +
βR
τn
≤ 0. (3a<)
With rearrangement, βRτ ≤ n˜∗T (τ + pβR). Inserting (8˜) into our equation, simple
calculation yields the lower bound on τ .
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Proof of Lemma 2
When does n∗T < n˜
∗
T hold? Using (6˜) and (8˜) results in
(β + γ)τˆ
(1 + β + γ)p
<
γτˆ + θ
γ¯p
.
Simple algebra yields the condition stated in Lemma 2.
Proof of Theorem 5
Using γ¯i = 1 + γi in (16) and inserting the new formula
ni =
γi(τˆ − θ)
γ¯i(pi − ϕ)
into θ = ϕ(f1n1 + f2n2) yields an implicit equation for ϕ:
θ = ϕ
(
f1
γ1(τˆ − θ)
γ¯1(p1 − ϕ) + f2
γ2(τˆ − θ)
γ¯2(p2 − ϕ)
)
.
With rearrangement,
θ
τˆ − θ = ϕ
(
f1γ1
γ¯1(p1 − ϕ) +
f2γ2
γ¯2(p2 − ϕ)
)
.
Having eliminated the denominators yields the quadratic equation (18)–(20) for ϕ.
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